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from the point of view of morality, the same as egoism, seeing that it only finds an *accidental* ground of distinction therefrom in the fact that the immediacy of nature does not *normally* pass the bounds of distinct groups. That the distinction is not of greater ethical importance than that between different *classes* of interests within each group is shown by our use of the terms "disinterested," "unselfish," which are alike used of "benevolent" actions, and of actions which involve the sacrifice of a lower to a higher class of "personal" interests, such as when a man prefers music or study to the charms of gain and "worldly" success.

It would appear, then, that if we are to use the terms "disinterested," "benevolent," etc., to express moral approval, defining the form of conduct implied as one that involves a reconstruction of tendencies on a basis of true objectivity, then what often passes for "disinterested," "benevolent" action is as "interested" and "selfish" as can be. The only true disinterestedness, involving a negation of the immediacy of nature and the giving up of it to a *true other*, is found in morality. Some kind of otherness there must always be; every self must have some world. Mere otherness is thus of no value; true otherness is everything. It may be said that other persons and not things alone can constitute the *other* of morality; but, then, they do so only mediately, or as themselves actual or possible members of the moral order. Morality alone is truly altruistic, and altruism (or egoism), to be true, must be moral.

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THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES.—AN EXPLANATION.

PROFESSOR CALDWELL'S comments on my "Theory of Social Forces" cover too much ground to admit of a detailed reply. There are, however, one or two points of so much importance as to demand discussion.

The reader must be on his guard when Professor Caldwell attempts to interpret my ideas in the fields of morals and religion. He seems to use these terms interchangeably, or at least he makes no clearly defined distinction between them. When he speaks of "altruistic (religious and moral) perceptions," I understand him to mean that both the religious and moral belong to the general class of the altruistic. To me they are radically different fields and have little in common except certain historical associations which

must sooner or later break down. The ideal of morality is a complete adjustment to the environment. The moral goal is reached when earth's best environment is entered and men submit to the conditions needed to retain it. This means practically that men must become altruistic and submit to a multitude of "Thou shalt nots."

Herbert Spencer tells us that the moral ideal is a life of "unalloyed pleasure." This sounds well ; but I think few people realize just what such an ideal involves, and how its realization would restrict our activities. Suppose men decided to avoid places where the sun is hot, where the fingers get cold, or where the air is polluted. If they should resort to these and other means of avoiding pain, there would be but few places where the race could exist. Even in these places the seeker for uninterrupted pleasure would be obliged to throw about himself a multitude of restraints limiting his activities and restricting his choices. His food, his drinks, the air, light, and temperature must be modified, improved, and softened so as to shut out possible sources of pain. Activity chafes under these restraints, and its pleasures are too intense to be sacrificed for the mere relief of pain. Such an existence would be like a life in a sanitarium, with a trained nurse to watch every movement and to prevent possible intrusion of pain. Perhaps the best examples of attempts to realize such a life are furnished by those fond mothers who, inspired by modern kindergarten notions, try to create a life of unalloyed pleasure for their children. From the birth of such children to the time they escape from the kindergarten they spend their time staring at the reds and blues, the longs and shorts, the cubes and squares of an artificial world. A trained servant follows them to ward off pain and coddles them with bushels of sensory impressions.

Such a hot-house life is the necessary result of the growth of our sensory concepts and of the resulting limitation which knowledge puts on activity. Let the sensory side of the mind have its way and the "Thou shalt nots" would pile up until all activity is destroyed. It is, therefore, proper to say that the goal of such progress is "a static type of man," and that "a study with these limitations cannot rank with biology and psychology in the hierarchy of the sciences." Morality, as I use the term, has these limitations, and must have its scope fixed by planetary conditions and the best environment which these conditions permit. Its two ideals are the avoidance of pain and a life of self-sacrifice, both of which are

due to the conditions of a pain economy. Only those who have been oppressed by the terrors of a pain economy want a life of unalloyed pleasure with nothing to do. Nor would any one sacrifice himself except to relieve the misery of others. If "unalloyed pleasure" were not an ideal, self-sacrifice would not be so inspiring. Those in whom the one ideal is prominent want a haven of rest in which they will be cared for, petted, protected; while the others long instinctively for a life of self-sacrifice like that of the trained nurse, the teacher, or the worker in the slums.

Herbert Spencer says that the relation of a mother to an infant represents the ideal of morality. The child enjoys a life of unalloyed pleasure, and the mother gets pleasure in the sacrifice that produces it. It is, however, questionable whether this complete adjustment is in the interests of the race. It would probably be better for the mother to let her child be fed from a bottle so that she can ride a bicycle or attend a woman's congress. Vigorous children can survive on artificial food, and the mother who sacrifices herself to prolong the life of a weakling injures herself and the race as well. So long as the terrors of a pain economy were so severe that the average mother died at thirty and had to bear a half-dozen children to bring one to maturity, a life of complete self-sacrifice was demanded. But when the length of life is prolonged and the probability of rearing children increased, less sacrifice is demanded and the life of a mother may become normal. This sacrifice may in time become an evil because it merely prolongs the life of weaklings or leads to over-population.

It is necessary to emphasize these facts to show the limitations which are imposed on morality as soon as its scope differs from that of religion. *Pure* morality is a set of sensory limitations imposed by a *pain* economy. *Pure* religion is a group of motor activities by which these limitations of the environment are surmounted. Religion is often said to be supernatural, but it is more fitting to call it *super-environmental*. To understand this thought the reader should notice that I use the term "environment" to denote the group of sensory concepts which come to the mind over the sensory nerves. Morality is environmental. Hard facts constantly remind each person of the difficulties of a life of unalloyed pleasure and of the need of self-sacrifice. The sensory nerves quickly tell us by the presence of pain when their normal functions are disturbed. Religion is super-environmental, and there are no nerves which transform it into sensory impressions. It is due to motor phe-

nomena which find no counterpart among the sensory concepts. A condition of this kind is possible if the motor side of the mind is more developed and responds to the stimuli of a larger world than does the sensory side of the mind.

In speaking of motor reactions as the older portion of the mind, I do not mean that they existed before any external stimuli had the power to arouse consciousness. I do, however, desire to emphasize the fact that the development of the motor nerves through which psychic control is exercised preceded the development of the sensory nerves through whose aid objects in the environment are pictured. It is possible for very indefinite stimuli to arouse prompt and vigorous reactions, but the knowledge possessed by an animal thus limited would be small and vague, although its motor reactions might be as certain and its psychic control as complete as that of the higher animals. Many insects can jump farther than they can see, and thus every movement may land them in an unknown world. It would be suicidal for such animals to limit their activities by their well-defined sensory concepts. Their motor reactions adjust them to a greater world than that which their sensory concepts create. There is, I think, the same difference between the sensory and motor environment of the human race. Its sensory environment is the static crust of this planet. Its motor environment is much more extensive. I doubt if there are any persons who never respond to other stimuli than those which the colors, forms, tastes, and smells of the material world create.

The word "environment" has a double meaning which deserves emphasis. When it is said that men are created or controlled by their environment, everything is included in this environment with which they come in contact or against which they react. Otherwise the doctrine is plainly inadequate. Most evolutionists, however, assume a parallelism between the sensory phenomena they perceive and the external stimuli that act on their organisms. They thus infer that the things men perceive coincide with, or at least reflect perfectly, the whole environment against which they react and to which they are adjusted. A host of untenable propositions are based on this assumption. Men become agnostics by assuming that the sensory world is the exact counterpart of the real environment to which their motor reactions adjust them. The motor powers of men may, however, harmonize with this larger world, and men may act as though they were in contact with the greater humanity that inhabits the universe. Such impulses create

our religious concepts and permit the scope of religion to exceed the static bounds within which the sensory concepts of morality are inclosed.

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A REPLY.

THIS "Explanation" hardly seems to me to deal with the main contentions of my "comments," except, perhaps, in one instance,—that of the emphasis I laid upon the real positive contribution of the "Theory of Social Forces." And Professor Patten rightly returns to this very point in his "Explanation,"—the idea of a larger world or a greater humanity with which we are in correspondence through our "motor powers."

I did not think my phrase "altruistic (religious and moral) perceptions" of very much importance to my comments. Still, Professor Patten thinks that the provinces of ethics and religion should be carefully distinguished. I agree with this, I am sure. Only I think that his whole line of thought is of more value to the science of religion than to the science of ethics. I am one of those who think that the whole discussion of ethical ideals in terms of pleasure and pain, and "sensory" and "motor" phenomena moves merely on the borderland of ethics; that, in fact, it is not ethics at all. I do not regard Herbert Spencer as a representative ethical philosopher. Aristotle is, and so is Butler; and so is Hegel or Cousin,—to take names from four peoples. These men all discuss "ends" of activity, or the equivalent of this, not the mere psychology of motives. And in general, I think, the "Theory" suffers from a tendency to make too much of biological psychology,—to separate in particular the sensory and the motor sides of the mind too far from one another. I heartily agree with the criticism in the present "Explanation" of the morality of the "Thou shalt nots" and of the moral ideal as "unalloyed pleasure." The main point of my comments was a criticism of the relations existing, according to Professor Patten, between psychology and sociology. There is not the slightest need of raising this now unless Dr. Patten desires to do so. I agree that this "Explanation" makes for overturning the whole pleasure morality of the senses, and it renders somewhat clearer the service of Dr. Patten in emphasizing the importance (*relative*, not *absolute*, to be sure) of the motor powers. I was really impressed with Professor Patten's criticism (in the